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OBSTACLES TO INCREASING AIRSPACE: JUMPING
THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HOOPS
TOM NEUHOFF, JR.
I. INTRODUCTION
AIRSPACE, THE "region of the atmosphere above a
plot of ground, municipality, state, or nation,"' can be
increased by lengthening runways; 2 changing types of air-
craft flown over an area;3 changing flight patterns, proce-
dures, and practices over residential areas; 4 and generally
expanding airports, resulting in increased air traffic.5
These increases in airspace cannot simply be made by
those wishing to make them, which is often the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), the military, or the airport
owner. Federal environmental laws and local zoning ordi-
nances prevent expansions from infringing on the rights
of those on the ground and on the environment in gen-
eral.6 This comment discusses some of the major
problems with expanding airspace, including the preemp-
tive effect of federal laws over conflicting local laws and
the mass of paper produced to procedurally satisfy the
federal environmental laws.
The primary inquiry of this comment, however, is
I RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 30 (rev. ed. 1982).
2 See C.A.R.E. Now, Inc. v. FAA, 844 F.2d 1569, 1573 (11th Cir. 1988); Steele
Creek Community Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Transp., 435 F. Supp. 196, 200
(W.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1978).
See Sierra Club v. Lehman, 825 F.2d 1366, 1367 (9th Cir. 1987).
See Runway 27 Coalition, Inc. v. Engen, 679 F. Supp. 95, 97 (D. Mass. 1987).
5 See Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 192 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 616 (1991).
6 See, e.g., infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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whether any major federal obstacle to increasing airspace
really exists. Near-airport residents vitally need environ-
mental laws preventing noise and air pollution increases
which would dramatically affect their quality of life and
their property values. But do the laws currently in effect
achieve such protections? Case law suggests that as long
as the proper federal agency performs the required stud-
ies before allowing the increase, the courts will defer to
the agency's judgment. 7 This judicial rationale seems log-
ical since the agencies are more knowledgeable and ex-
perienced than the courts. The agencies, especially the
military, however, are not wholly disinterested in the out-
come of their studies. This fact shades the whole ap-
proval process with a tint of unfairness to those seeking to
halt the expansions. The laws passed by Congress pres-
ent no true obstacles but rather are mere procedural
speed bumps in the runway to expansion.
II. CONFLICTS BETWEEN FEDERAL AND LOCAL
LAWS
Often cities, counties, or states pass zoning laws forbid-
ding airports from expanding or increasing noise levels. 8
These laws often conflict with federal laws or, more accu-
rately, attempt to regulate an area preempted by federal
law.9 Currently, the power to regulate airport noise and
use is "allocated under a scheme which leaves neither air-
7 See infra notes 158-258 and-accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., BURBANK, CAL., MUN. CODE § 20-32.1 (1969) (ordinance making it
unlawful for jet aircraft to take off between 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.); CAL. PUB.
UTIL. CODE §§ 21669-21669.4 (West 1991) (California statutes outlining stan-
dards for continued operation of airports and regulating noise level of aircraft in
flight). Both statutes were held invalid either in full or in part based on federal
law preemption. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S.
624, 633 (1973) (Burbank ordinance preempted by Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
§§ 307, 611, 1108, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1431, 1508 (1988)); Air Transp. Ass'n of
America v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58, 65 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (California statute pre-
empted by Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 307, 611, 1108, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1348,
1431, 1508 (1988)).
9 Compare Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 307, 611, 1108, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1348,
1431, 1508 (1988) with BURBANK, CAL., MUN. CODE § 20-32.1 and CAL. PUB.
UTIL. CODE §§ 21669-21669.4.
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port proprietors nor the federal government in clear con-
trol .... It is a classic study in federalism - the national
interest in promoting transportation versus the local in-
terest in preserving the quality of life in residential neigh-
borhoods near airports."10
The first major case concerning possible federal pre-
emption was Cooley v. Board of Wardens." In Cooley, the
Court held that "the power to regulate commerce, em-
braces a vast field .... Whatever subjects of this power
are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform
system, or plan or regulation, may justly be said to be of
such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Con-
gress." 12 The Cooley philosophy surfaces in cases involv-
ing local regulations of aircraft activity. In City of Burbank
v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., t s the operator of the
Hollywood-Burbank Airport joined Pacific Southwest Air-
lines in bringing an action to have an ordinance14 passed
by the City Council of Burbank, California declared un-
lawful and to enjoin its enforcement. The ordinance
made it illegal for a jet aircraft to depart the airport be-
tween the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. and for an
airport to permit such use. A Pacific Southwest flight was
the only one affected by such ordinance.
Relying on both the Supremacy Clause' 5 and the Com-
merce Clause' 6 of the United States Constitution, the dis-
trict court held the curfew ordinance unconstitutional.' 7
10 Lee L. Blackman & Roger P. Freeman, The Environmental Consequences of Munic-
ipal Airports: A Subject of Federal Mandate?, 53J. AIR L. & COM. 375, 382 (1987).
1 53 U.S. (1 How.) 299 (1851).
12 Id. at 319.
13 411 U.S. at 624.
14 BURBANK, CAL., MUN. CODE § 20-32.1.
15 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states that "[t]his Constitu-
tion, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof
, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... Id.
.6 Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause states that "[tihe Congress shall
have Power... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sev-
eral States, and with the Indian Tribes .... Id.
I7 Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914, 916 (C.D.
Cal. 1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 667, 676 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 411 U.S. 624, 625
(1973).
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The court of appeals upheld the lower court's ruling with
respect to the Supremacy Clause on grounds of preemp-
tion and conflict. 8 The Supreme Court affirmed and
found the doctrine of preemption alone sufficient to dis-
pose of the case.' 9
The Supreme Court based its holding on the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958,20 the Noise Control Act of 1972,21
and the regulations designed to implement the acts.2 2
The Federal Aviation Act (the Act) dictates that the
United States possesses sole control over the country's
airspace. 23 The Act empowers the FAA to regulate navi-
gable airspace insuring safety and efficiency in the air and
on the ground.24  The Noise Control Act of 1972
amended the Federal Aviation Act by providing that the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would have a
role in controlling aircraft noise problems.2 5
Despite the authority given to the agencies by the acts,
18 Burbank, 457 F.2d at 676.
'9 Burbank, 411 U.S. at 625.
20 49 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1508 (1988). See infra notes 23, 24.
21 49 U.S.C. § 1431. See infra note 25.
22 14 C.F.R. §§ 71, 73, 75, 77, 91, 93, 95, 97 (1991).
23 49 U.S.C. § 1508(a). Section 1508(a) provides in part: "The United States
of America is declared to possess and exercise complete and exclusive national
sovereignty in the airspace of the United States .... Id.
24 49 U.S.C. §§ 1348(a), (c). Section 1348(a) provides in part:
The Administrator is authorized and directed to develop plans for
and formulate policy with respect to the use of the navigable air-
space; and assign by rule, regulation, or order the use of the naviga-
ble airspace under such terms, conditions, and limitations as he may
deem necessary in order to insure the safety of aircraft and the effi-
cient utilization of such airspace.
Id. § 1348(a). Section 1348(c) provides:
The administrator is further authorized and directed to prescribe air
traffic rules and regulations governing the flight of aircraft, for the
navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft, for the protec-
tion of persons and property on the ground, and for the efficient
utilization of the navigable airspace, including rules as to safe alti-
tudes of flight and rules for the prevention of collision between air-
craft, between aircraft and land or water vehicles, and between
aircraft and airborne objects.
Id. § 1348(c).
25 49 U.S.C. § 1431. Section 1431(b)(1) provides that "[i]n order to afford
present and future relief and protection to the public health and welfare from
aircraft noise and sonic boom, the FAA, after consultation with the Secretary of
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the Supreme Court recognized that there is no express
provision mandating preemption of non-federal laws
which infringe on the agency's power.26 Yet, the Court
held the Burbank ordinance unlawful. 27 "It is the perva-
sive nature of the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft
noise that leads us to conclude that there is preemp-
tion."' 28  Perhaps Justice Jackson made the most colorful
description of federal preemption when he stated,
"[p]lanes do not wander about in the sky like vagrant
clouds. They move only by federal permission, subject to
federal inspection .... The moment a ship taxis onto a
runway it is caught up in an elaborate and detailed system
of controls. ' 29 The Court feared other cities would enact
similar curfew laws if it upheld the Burbank law.3 0 The
timing of departures and arrivals would be disrupted, the
FAA's control would be limited, and safety problems
would result.3
The Burbank decision was not so clear-cut despite the
seemingly rational fear of chaos if other cities followed
suit. Four justices, led by Justice Rehnquist, dissented.
Transportation and with EPA, shall prescribe and amend standards for the mea-
surement of aircraft noise and sonic boom ...." Id. § 1431(b)(1).
26 Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633.
27 Id. The Court maintained:
Congress legislated here in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied.... So we start with the assumption that the historic po-
lice powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress....
Such a purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The scheme of
federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it.... Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject .... Like-
wise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the
character or obligations imposed by it may reveal the same pur-
pose .... Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent with
the objective of the federal statute.
Id. (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
28 Id.
29 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson,J.,
concurring).
3o Burbank, 411 U.S. at 636.
31 Id. at 639.
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They believed that the power to control noise was well
within those traditionally belonging to the states.32 The
dissent believed that intent to preempt was not evident in
the acts and that the ordinance should therefore be al-
lowed to stand. 3 Today's conservative Supreme Court
may have decided Burbank as the dissenters had wished.
The Bush administration would certainly have concurred
with the dissenters in Burbank, viewing federal laws as in-
fringing on state power. 4
Two years after Burbank, in 1975, the Court of the
Northern District of California drew clearer lines as to
when preemption occurs. In Air Transport Ass'n of America
v. Crotti,5 the airlines and the airports were adversaries
rather than united as in Burbank. The airlines sought to
declare California regulations3 6  invalid under the
Supremacy Clause37 and the Commerce Clause,3 8 just as
in Burbank. The airports and cities where they were lo-
cated were relying on the California regulations mandat-
ing statewide aircraft noise reduction for the benefit of
residential communities. The permitted level was termed
the Community Noise Equivalent Level (CNEL), and no
noise was to be generated above this level after December
31, 1985.31 The regulations codified methods to reduce
the noise level. 40 Not only did California enact the CNEL
standards for airports, it also established maximum Single
32 Id. at 643 (Rehnquist,J.,joined by Stewart, White & Marshall,JJ., dissenting).
33 Id.
'4 FAA Focuses on Compatible Land Use in Next Phase of Noise Policy, AIRPORTS, Jan.
19, 1991, at 45, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
3- 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
36 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 21669-21669.4 (West 1991).
37 U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2.
38 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
39 Crotti, 389 F. Supp. at 61.
40 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 5011 (West 1991). The "Methodology for Controlling
and Reducing Noise Problems" provided:
The methods whereby the impact of airport noise shall be con-
trolled and reduced include but are not limited to the following:
(a) Encouraging use of the airport by aircraft classes with lower
AIRSPACE EXPANSION
Event Noise Exposure Levels (SENEL).4" If an aircraft ex-
ceeded the SENEL limit, the violation was a misde-
meanor, and the county could fine the aircraft operator
$1000.42
The airlines relied on Burbank and claimed that both the
CNEL and SENEL regulations were preempted by federal
law because they attempted to regulate aircraft in direct
flight. The airports, however, relied on a footnote from
Burbank43 to distinguish themselves from the Burbank
City Council. Footnote fourteen stated that "[a]irport
owners acting as proprietors can presently deny the use of
their airports to aircraft on the basis of noise considera-
tions so long as such exclusion is nondiscriminatory. 44
The Burbank ordinance was an act of police power, not an
act of a proprietor of an airport.45 The Supreme Court in
Burbank did not consider whether its limits would apply to
a municipal proprietor of an airport attempting to limit
noise. Yet such a scenario arose in Crotti. The district
court in Crotti made the distinction between a municipal
proprietor (the type in Crotti) and a private one (the type
in Burbank), thus narrowing the scope of Burbank signifi-
cantly, since most airports are owned by municipalities.46
noise level characteristics and discouraging use by higher noise level
aircraft classes;
(b) Encouraging approach and departure flight paths and proce-
dures to minimize the noise in residential areas;
(c) Planning runway utilization schedules to take into account ad-
jacent periods;
(d) Reduction of the flight frequency, particularly in the most
noise sensitive time periods and by the noisier aircraft;
(e) Employing shielding for advantage, using natural terrain,
building .... and
(0 Development of a compatible land use within the noise impact
boundary.
ld.
41 Id. § 5006(d).
42 Id.
43 Burbank, 411 U.S. at 635-36 n.14 (citing letter from the Secretary of Trans-




46 Crotti, 389 F. Supp. at 63.
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The court held that since an airport proprietor is re-
sponsible for the operation of its public airport, it must
have the right to control the use of the facility, subject to
state police power.47 "Manifestly, such proprietary con-
trol necessarily includes the basic right to determine the
type of air service a given airport proprietor wants its fa-
cilities to provide, as well as the type of aircraft to utilize
those facilities."" The federal government cannot man-
date that an airport build larger or more runways in order
to accommodate larger or more aircraft. 9 In addition,
the government cannot force an airport to acquire addi-
tional noise easements so that it can receive noisier air-
craft. 5' The United States "should not substitute its
judgment for that of the States or elements of local gov-
ernment who ... own and operate our Nation's airports.
[The Federal Aviation Act of 1958] is not designed to do
this and will not prevent airport proprietors from exclud-
ing any aircraft on the basis of noise considerations.'
The Crotti court held that measuring noise levels at and
near airports fails to invade or affect aircraft in direct
flight.52 The methods to help accomplish the CNEL are
"patently within local police power control and beyond
the intent of Congress in the federal legislation" with the
possible exception of Section 5011 (d) which allows the re-
duction of flight frequency. 3 After seeming to support
the CNEL provisions as lawful, the court dodged that de-
termination and merely ruled on the SENEL provisions.54
41 Id. at 63-64 (citing Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S.
182 (1923); Trans World Airlines v. City and County of San Francisco, 228 F.2d
473 (9th Cir. 1955)).
48 Crotti, 389 F. Supp. at 64.
49 S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1968) (legislative history of Federal
Aviation Act of 1958).
50 Id.
5' Crotti, 389 F. Supp. at 64.
.52 Id. at 64-65.
53 Id. at 65.
-1 Id. The court evaded the resolution of the CNEL laws, stating:
Whether or not the CNEL requirements and regulations are in fact
unrealistic, arbitrary and unreasonable, and an abuse of police pow-
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The court resolved that the SENEL provisions, regulating
the noise of an aircraft in direct flight, were an invalid use
of state police power in the area concerning aircraft flights
and operations as well as airspace management and utili-
zation. 55 "The thrust of the Single Event Noise Exposure
Levels is clear and direct and collides head-on with the
federal regulatory scheme for aircraft flights .... 56
Out of Crotti emerges the following rule: an airport pro-
prietor (usually a local entity) has the right to control the
use of its airport under the supervision and direction of
state police power or on its own initiative. However,
when such state or local supervision intrudes and touches
aircraft in direct flight, an unlawful exercise of police
power has occurred, and such police power will be pre-
empted by federal law.58
In Faux-Burhans v. County Commissioners of Frederick
County,5 9 the question of when preemption takes hold was
quite clearly answered. The case involved the owner of a
private airfield and a county's law restricting its use.60
The court cited Burbank and the fact that the regulations
involved there "clearly infringed upon the federally pre-
empted regulation of navigable airspace, by directly af-
fecting the manner in which, and the type of aircraft by
which, flight operations were to be conducted from air-
ports that were otherwise open to air traffic in general.
61
The effect of the ordinance in the instant case, however,
was different. It did not regulate noise emissions or flight
operations but rather governed the numbers of aircraft,
ers constituting an unlawful burden or infringement upon any
United States constitutional right of privilege held by a proprietor of
an airport, or an unreasonable burden upon interstate and foreign
commerce as utilized by aircraft, is not before us upon undisputed
facts and must await a future day of judgment.
Id.
55 Id. at 64.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 63-34.
58 Id. at 65.
-9 674 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Md. 1987).
60 See Frederick County, Md., Zoning Ordinance § 1-19-381 (1977).
61 Faux-Burhans, 674 F. Supp. at 1174.
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types of aircraft, and types of aircraft operations (i.e. no
instructional flights allowed) .62 The court held these ar-
eas to be of local concern.6 3
These guidelines regarding what local laws can be pre-
empted are an exercise in fine line drawing. The Supreme
Court proclaimed in Burbank that a curfew regulation
passed by a city was invalid and preempted by federal
law,64 yet stated in a footnote that an airport proprietor
can nondiscriminatorily refuse use of the facility by air-
craft on the basis of noise considerations.65 Assuming
that the airport was owned by the city and was in favor of
the regulation but the airline was not,66 does Burbank
mean that since only one airline had a flight after the
11:00 p.m. curfew, then the regulation will be held dis-
criminatory, and that if all airlines had an equal number of
flights after 11:00 p.m. the regulation would be upheld?
Clearly not. Since the regulation concerned aircraft in di-
rect flight, it was preempted, and the discrimination ques-
tion was mute. The discrimination issue can only arise
when the regulation does not impact aircraft in direct
flight. Burbank, Crotti, and Faux-Burhans all show that air-
ports and municipalities can limit certain types of aircraft
activity that are historically subject to non-federal police
power. Yet, when the regulation focuses directly on air-
craft flight, it is preempted by federal law. Still, based on
footnote fourteen of Burbank, it appears airport proprie-
tors may infringe on this federal area more than the mu-
nicipalities in which the airports lie. Of course, in most
cases, the municipality is the airport owner and the differ-
ence becomes irrelevant.
Currently, a clash between owner-proprietor and non-
owner-municipality is raging in Texas. The proprietors of
the Dallas-Forth Worth International Airport (DFW) are
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Burbank, 411 U.S. at 639.
61 Id. at 635 n.14.
-6 Recall that in Burbank both the airport and airline were opposed to the city's
regulation. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth. The airport, however,
lies within three communities in between the proprietors,
Euless, Grapevine, and Irving (the Municipalities). In
1988, the airport announced plans to expand by adding
two runways at a cost of $3.5 billion.6 7 The Municipalities
passed zoning ordinances soon after the announced
plans, forbidding the airport's expansion without their
permission.68 The airport claims the ordinances, purport-
edly for land use regulation, are actually an attempt to
limit air traffic and noise, areas traditionally subject to
federal control. 69 The Municipalities, however, contend
that the airport must, like any real estate developer, seek
permission prior to expanding within city limits. 70
The Municipalities won the first legal battle. 7' A Texas
district judge ruled that a city has the right to enforce its
own zoning laws despite state and federal laws.72
Federal preemption would clearly apply were this a case of
a more 'classic' nature, e.g., adjacent cities attempting to
regulate noise, establish curfew, limit landing weight or
otherwise regulate aircraft at an existing facility. The criti-
cal circumstance here, however, is not the day-to-day op-
eration of an existing airport but a planned $3.5 billion
expansion, including a territorial expansion.73
The judge stated that this distinction began in other
courts between regulations affecting flight operations and
those concerning traditional areas of police power, such
as land use regulation. 4 The airport has asked for the
judge to clarify his opinion and currently plans an ap-
67 Stacey Freedenthal, Battle Over D/FW Expansion Reaches Court, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Sept. 25, 1991, at 25A, 29A.
6 Irving, Tex., Ordinances 5732, 5733 (Jan. 4, 1990); Euless, Tex., Ordinance
1016 (Nov. 20, 1989); Grapevine, Tex., Ordinances 89-81 to 82 (Dec. 21, 1989).
69 Stacey Freedenthal, Judge to Rule Next Week in Dispute over D/FW, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 25, 1991, at 29A.
70 Id.
71 Order on Cross Mot. for Summ.J., at 9, Dallas-Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd.
v. City of Irving, No. 90-4298-I (162d Judicial Dist. Ct. - Dallas County, Oct. 8,
1991).
72 Id. at 2.
" Id. at 5.
74 Id. at 2-3.
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peal, 75 so the fight is not concluded.
It appears that the law as it now stands depends upon
the nature of the regulation. If it is one limiting aircraft
activity in direct flight, it will be preempted by federal law.
If, on the other hand, it focuses primarily on operations
and aircraft use on the ground, the regulation will be
permitted.
III. THE FEDERAL LAWS
Though it is unclear whether the proponent of change
through expansion or restriction must comply with local
laws, it is clear that the effects of the proposed change
must be studied and reported by a federal agency. These
studies are mandated by the federal environmental laws.76
The process of wading through the federal requirements
is a long one, but it is not as complicated as it may first
appear. Even if all the federal studies conclude that the
change will have no significant impact on the environ-
ment, it may still not be allowed to progress if a local law
prohibits such a change and if this law is not preempted
by the federal ones under the standards discussed above.
At the outset, one must look to the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 77 "The [NEPA] is our
75 Nancy St. Pierre & Steve Scott,Judge Rules D/FW Airport Must Get Cities'OK to
Expand, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 9, 1991, at IA.
76 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988).
77 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
70 (1988 & Supp. 1991)). This comment is concerned with the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) regulations designed to implement the NEPA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4370; 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1988). Despite claims that an agency has not satis-
fied the procedural requirements of the NEPA, those seeking to halt the proposed
action often bring claims under other federal statutes. See, e.g., Steele Creek Com-
munity Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Transp., 435 F. Supp. 196, 197 (W.D.N.C.
1977) (plaintiffs brought action under Airport and Airway Development Act of
1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1716(c)(4) (1988), in addition to the NEPA). Congress has
taken a shotgun approach to protecting the environment by passing legislation in
response to each problem. Hence, there are many acts that have historically been
used to accomplish the same objectives as NEPA, including the Department of
Transportation Act of 1966, Id. § 303'(1988); the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Id.
§ 1301; the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Id. §§ 1716(c)(4),
2201(a)(7),(11); the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, Id.
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basic national charter for protection of the environment.
It establishes policy, sets goals .... and provides means
... for carrying out the policy."178 The NEPA has three
goals: (1) to outline a national policy encouraging worth-
while and enjoyable harmony between man and his envi-
ronment; (2) to prevent or extinguish environmental
damage and foster the health and welfare of man; and (3)
to educate the nation on the importance of ecological sys-
tems and natural resources.79
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was cre-
ated to implement the NEPA and to orchestrate the de-
tails of implementation.8 CEQ regulations invoke the
NEPA and inform federal agencies of actions they must
take in order to comply with NEPA procedures.8 ' The ex-
ecutive (including agencies) and judicial branches of gov-
ernment share the burden of enforcing the Act in order to
accomplish the goals mentioned above.8 2 The NEPA pro-
cedures guarantee provision of environmental informa-
tion to public officials and citizens prior to final decisions
and irreversible actions.8 3  Unfortunately, the task in-
volves an immense amount of paperwork, beginning with
an Environmental Assessment (EA),84 followed by either a
Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI)a5 or a more de-
tailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). a
A. THE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
The NEPA never calls for an EA. It only calls for an
§ 2208(b)(5) (1988); and the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Control Act of
1970, Id. §§ 2103, 2104, 2107 (1988). These statutes are not discussed in this
comment.
78 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (1991).
79 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
- See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1..3 (1991).
81 Id. §§ 1500-1508. For example, agencies must interpret the Act, implement
procedures, integrate other environmental laws, encourage and facilitate public
involvement, and identify all reasonable alternatives. Id.
82 Id. § 1500.1(a); see supra text accompanying note 79.
81 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(b), 1506.6 (1991).
- Id. § 1501.3.
81 Id. § 1501.4(e).
86 Id. § 1501.4.
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EIS.87 The Act leaves to the CEQ the task of providing
the exact procedures one must follow when engaging in
an activity that may potentially have an adverse effect on
the environment.8  An EA is a brief document used to
determine whether a further, more in-depth, study should
be undertaken or whether the proposed change will have
so little impact that no further study is necessary.8 9
Section 1501.3 of the CEQis not definite about when an
agency should prepare an assessment.90 Though it ap-
pears on its face to allow agencies to form their own pro-
cedures regarding when an EA should be prepared,
section 1507.3 provides that agency procedures are sub-
ject to CEQ and public review prior to publication. 9
Although section 1508.9 states that a federal agency is re-
sponsible for the EA,92 case law maintains that it does not
actually have to be performed by the agency. Any individ-
87 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
88 Id. § 4332(2)(B).
89 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9. The section provides that:
'Environmental assessment': (a) Means a concise public document
for which a Federal agency is responsible that serves to: (1) Briefly
provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to
prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of no signif-
icant impact. (2) Aid an agency's compliance with the Act when no
environmental impact statement is necessary. (3) Facilitate prepara-
tion of a statement when one is necessary. (b) Shall include brief
discussions of the need for the proposal, of alternatives . . . of the
environmental impacts of the proposed action and alternatives, and
a listing of the agencies and persons consulted.
Id.
8o Id. § 1501.3. This section provides that:
(a) Agencies shall prepare an environmental assessment . . . when
necessary under procedures adopted by individual agencies to sup-
plement these regulations as described in § 1507.3. An assessment
is not necessary if the agency has decided to prepare an environmen-
tal impact statement. (b) Agencies may prepare an environmental
assessment on any action at any time in order to assist agency plan-
ning and decisionmaking.
Id.
9' Id. § 1507.3. Section 1507.3 provides that: "[e]ach agency shall consult
with the Council while developing its procedures and before publishing them ...
for comment .... The procedures shall be adopted only after an opportunity for
public review and after review by the Council for conformity with the Act and
these regulations." Id.
92 Id. § 1508.9.
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ual or organization desiring the change may hire a con-
sulting firm to perform the assessment.93 Problems may
arise, however, in a court action challenging the suffi-
ciency of the EA if the agency has not conducted its own
independent study. 4 Based on the outcome of the EA,
the agency will decide whether an EIS or a FONSI should
be prepared. 95
B. THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
Though not discussing the requirement of an EA, the
NEPA does mandate the necessity of an EIS. 96 In short,
the statute requires that the agency shall produce a state-
ment concerning the environmental impact of the pro-
posed action and the alternatives to the action.97
1. Who Prepares an EIS?
An EIS must be prepared "directly by [the lead agency]
or by a contractor selected by the lead agency or [possi-
93 See, e.g., C.A.R.E. Now, Inc. v. FAA, 844 F.2d 1569, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988)
(county hired private consulting firm to prepare EA of runway extension); Citi-
zens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 192 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 616 (1991) (Port Authority hired consultants to prepare EA and draft
EIS).
94 See, e.g., Citizens Against Burlington, 938 F.2d at 202 (court ordered FAA to
determine if a conflict of interest existed when Port Authority hired consultants to
prepare EA and draft EIS).
95 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (1991).
- 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1988). This section provides that all federal govern-
ment agencies shall:
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for leg-
islation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the re-
sponsible official on - (i) the environmental impact of the proposed
action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the
proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses
of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of
long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented.
Id.
97 ld.
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bly] ... a cooperating agency."" s In this respect, the EA
and EIS differ. In Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 99
for example, the city of Toledo decided to expand one of
its airports. The Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority
wanted to use Toledo as a cargo hub so it hired Coffman
Associates, a consulting firm, to prepare the EA and then
to transform it into an EIS. The FAA sent a draft of the
EIS to the EPA and then made the draft public. The FAA
later published the final EIS. The court held that the FAA
violated CEQ regulations by failing to select the consult-
ant that prepared the EIS, but ruled the violation was not
significant enough to "compromise the 'objectivity and in-
tegrity of the NEPA process.' "t0
2. When Must an EIS Be Prepared?
Though section 4332(2) of the NEPA sets the general
guidelines, the CEQhelps draw clearer lines as to when an
EIS should be prepared. Section 1501.4 of the CEQpro-
vides that an agency should rely on its procedures when
determining whether a type of action requires an EIS. l0 '
If it does, an EIS should be prepared. If the action is one
98 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c) (1991).
938 F.2d at 190.
I00 Id. at 202. See infra text accompanying notes 158-258 for a detailed discus-
sion of agencies preparing the EISs and the bias that exists as a result.
-0- 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (1991). This section provides:
In determining whether to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment the Federal agency shall:
(a) Determine under its procedures supplementing these
regulations .. .whether the proposal is one which:
(1) Normally requires an environmental impact state-
ment, or
(2) Normally does not require either an environmen-
tal impact statement or an environmental assessment
(b) If the proposed action is not covered by paragraph (a) of
this section, prepare an environmental assessment (§ 1508.9).
The agency shall involve environmental agencies, applicants,
and the public, to the extent practicable, in preparing assess-
ments required by § 1508.9(a)(1).
(c) Based on the environmental assessment make its deter-
mination whether to prepare an environmental impact
statement.
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that does not normally require either an EIS or an EA,
then none should be prepared. But, if it is not a typical
proposal that is discussed in the procedures, an EA
should automatically be prepared. 0 2 The EA will be used
to determine if an EIS or FONSI should be prepared.10 3
If the FAA issues a FONSI, the increase or expansion in
airspace will be allowed to take place unless challenged in
court. 0
4
(d) Commence the scoping process (§ 1501.7), if the agency
will prepare an environmental impact statement.
(e) Prepare a finding of no significant impact (§ 1508.13), if
the agency determines on the basis of the environmental as-
sessment not to prepare a statement.
(1) The agency shall make the finding of no signifi-
cant impact available to the affected public as specified
in § 1506.6.
(2) In certain limited circumstances, which the agency
may cover in its procedures under § 1507.3, the agency
shall make the finding of no significant impact available
for public review . . . for 30 days before the agency
makes its final determination whether to prepare an
environmental impact statement and before the action
may begin. The circumstances are:
(i) The proposed action is, or is closely similar
to, one which normally requires the preparation
of an environmental impact statement under the
procedures adopted by the agency pursuant to
§ 1507.3, or




103 Id.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1991). Section 1508.13 defines a Finding
of No Significant Impact as:
a document by a Federal agency briefly presenting the reasons why
an action ... will not have a significant effect on the human environ-
ment and for which an environmental impact statement therefore
will not be prepared. It shall include the environmental assessment
or a summary of it and shall note any other environmental docu-
ments related to it.
Id. Human environment includes "natural and physical environment" but "eco-
nomic and social effects are not intended by themselves to require preparation of
an EIS." Id. § 1508.14.
104 See, e.g., C.A.R.E. Now, Inc. v. FAA, 844 F.2d 1569, 1572 (1lth Cir. 1988)
(plaintiffs did not like results of FONSI and filed petition for review in the Elev-
enth Circuit).
238 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [58
3. What Alternatives Must Be Discussed?
The issue of alternatives is perhaps the most important
in terms of sufficiency of an EIS. Confusion lies in the fact
that the term "alternatives" is not self-defining. 0 5 The
courts have adopted the standard that only "feasible" and
"reasonable" alternatives need be discussed, but these
terms are not clear-cut either. 0 6 The ultimate decision
lies with the agency when deciding which alternatives to
consider in an EIS. 10 7 Therefore, the party responsible
must define its objectives from the start.'0 8 Once again,
the same problems arise if an interested party is determin-
ing the alternatives. Will an interested party study the op-
tions devoutly if the goal is to have the change occur at
the original site?1' 9
IV. JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS
If an entity wants to challenge the sufficiency of an EA
or an EIS, it must do so in court."t 0 The question of
which court, though seemingly possessing a clear answer,
is not completely resolved. In City ofAlexandria v. Helms,"'
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that, pursuant to federal statute," 2 review of FAA or-
105 Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 616 (1991).
106 Id. at 195; City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam) ("When the purpose is to accomplish one thing, it makes no sense to
consider the alternative ways by which another thing might be achieved."); City of
New York v. Department of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1983) (dis-
cussing alternatives in environmental assessments); Davison v. Department of De-
fense, 560 F. Supp. 1019, 1025 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (reviewing whether EIS
contained sufficient information for reasonable choice among alternatives to be
made).
107 Citizens Against Burlington, 938 F.2d at 195 (citing North Slope Borough v.
Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
108 Id.
to See infra notes 128-157 and accompanying text relating to the court's stan-
dard of review and guidelines for measuring the sufficiency of environmental
statements.
40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1991).
728 F.2d 643 (4th Cir. 1984).
112 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1988). This section provides: "Any order, affirmative
or negative, issued by the Board or Administrator under this chapter ... shall be
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ders rests solely in the courts of appeals."13  However,
"[a]ctions which are not (or not yet) orders but which are
nonetheless reviewable may be raised in the district
court."" 4 The dispute in Helms arose when the Metropol-
itan Washington Council of Governments requested that
the FAA temporarily alter take-off paths in hopes of dis-
tributing aircraft noise more evenly over a larger geo-
graphic area. If a temporary alteration was found
satisfactory, it would be made permanent. The FAA pre-
pared an EA which was then subject to public review. The
agency then concluded that an EIS was unnecessary. The
City of Alexandria and the County Board of Arlington
County believed that an EIS should have been prepared
and filed suit in district court to enjoin the FAA from con-
ducting the temporary tests.
The district court granted the temporary injunction. 1 5
The court of appeals held that a reviewable administrative
record was the key factor in determining whether the FAA
decision was an "order" for purposes of the Federal Avia-
tion Act." 6 The key to whether the order was final was
whether the action could be executed without further in-
vestigation." 7 The court concluded that the FAA deci-
sion in this case was a final order, and therefore the
subject to review by the courts of appeals of the United States or the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia . Id.
11 Helms, 728 F.2d at 645.
14 Id. (quoting City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 646. See also Sierra Club v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding the existence of a reviewable, administrative record, rather than the
FAA's own characterization of its action, is determinative of whether action is an
order within meaning of statute vesting judicial review of order of FAA exclusively
in courts of appeals); State of N.Y. v. FAA, 712 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir. 1983)
(holding term "order" should receive a liberal construction); Sima Products v.
McLucas, 612 F.2d 309, 312-14 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980) (hold-
ing that broad discretion should be given as to what constitutes an order; order
includes actions which are a product of informal rule making); Puget Sound Traf-
fic Ass'n v. CAB, 536 F.2d 437, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding final agency deci-
sion subject to judicial review "is one which imposes an obligation, denies a right,
or fixes some legal relationship").
"7 Helms, 728 F.2d at 646.
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district court lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction.1 8
In City of Southlake v. FAA, 9 a local community brought
suit in district court to enjoin the use of a new runway at
DFW until a supplemental EIS was prepared to consider
alternatives. Citing Helms with approval, the court held
that exclusive jurisdiction lay with the court of appeals. 20
Under section 1486(a) of the Federal Aviation Act,' 2' the
district court had "no jurisdiction to review an order of
the FAA-even where the basic complaint is that the FAA
has failed to require the preparation of an [EIS] under
NEPA." 12 2
In Township of Delhi v. McArtor,123 the district court,
though citing Helms and other cases, 2 4 decided the merits
of the case in the interest of judicial economy. 2 5 It ap-
pears from the weight of authority that the district court
in Township of Delhi did not have jurisdiction and that ex-
clusive jurisdiction of FAA final orders does in fact rest
with the courts of appeals. Many other district courts
have also exercised jurisdiction in similar matters despite
the Federal Aviation Act.' 26  Yet, some of the district
court cases may be distinguishable, and jurisdiction may
118 Id.
119 679 F. Supp. 618 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
120 Id. at 619.
121 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1988).
122 City of Southlake, 679 F. Supp. at 621.
123 696 F. Supp. 1157 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
124 Id. at 1160 (citing C.A.R.E. Now, Inc. v. FAA, 844 F.2d 1569, 1570 (11th
Cir. 1988) (noting in note 1 that the court of appeals has jurisdiction); Suburban
O'Hare Comm'n v. Dole, 787 F.2d 186, 192-93 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 847
(1986) (stating that if any ambiguity exists between which court, district or appel-
late, has jurisdiction, it must be resolved in favor of the appellate court); State of
New York v. FAA, 712 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1983)). See also City of Aurora v. Hunt,
749 F.2d 1457, 1464 (10th Cir. 1984) (court of appeals review of FAA decision is
to ensure that the agency has not abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily or
capriciously).
125 McArtor, 696 F. Supp. at 1160-61.
126 See, e.g., Davison v. Department of Defense, 560 F. Supp. 1019, 1033-37
(S.D. Ohio 1982) (holding that a supplemental EIS must be prepared addressing
potential impact of action on sleeping habits); Steele Creek Community Ass'n




actually exist because of the lack of an agency order. 2 7
Jurisdiction may rest in the district court when agency ac-
tion is a decision to do nothing rather than an order that
something be done.
V. THE POWER OF THE COURTS: STANDARD
OF REVIEW
Once jurisdiction is established, how does the court re-
view an agency order for compliance with the NEPA? The
circuit courts vary as to whether a decision by the agency
will be upheld if (1) reasonable or (2) not arbitrary, capri-
cious, or an abuse of discretion. In C.A.R.E. Now, Inc. v.
FAA,' 28 the Eleventh Circuit summarized the state of the
law in the different circuits.'2 9 The court noted that under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) t 30 a reviewing
court may overturn agency action if it is "arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accord-
ance with the law."' 3' The court, however, elected to
review the agency decision not to prepare an EIS (to do
nothing) with a higher degree of scrutiny, using the stan-
dard of reasonableness.13 2 Other circuits using the stan-
dard of reasonableness when an agency decision is not to
prepare an EIS are the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits. 3 3 On the other hand, the First, Second, Fourth,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits follow the arbitrary and capri-
127 See, e.g., Runway 27 Coalition, Inc. v. Engen, 679 F. Supp. 95, 109 (D. Mass.
1987) (holding that an EA must be prepared); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Adams, 434 F. Supp. 403, 407 (D.C. 1977) (holding that an EIS must be pre-
pared regarding a national airport system plan for the development of public air-
ports in the United States).
128 844 F.2d 1569 (11 th Cir. 1988).
129 Id. at 1572-73 n.3. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
.30 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
131 CA.R.E. Now, Inc., 844 F.2d at 1572 n.3.
132 Id. at 1572 (the agency's decision not to act must be a reasonable one in
light of all the facts and circumstances).
,33 See Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1973); Win-
nebago Tribe of Neb. v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 271 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
836 (1980); Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. Department of Agric., 681 F.2d
1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1982); Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. Department of
Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 621 (10th Cir. 1987).
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cious standard. 34
It is likely that the circuits following the arbitrary and
capricious standard in reviewing EIS cases will use the
standard not only for cases where no EIS has been pre-
pared, but also in cases challenging the sufficiency of the
EIS. It would not seem logical that a circuit would shift to
a stricter standard (one of reasonableness) when merely
reviewing the sufficiency of an EIS, as opposed to decid-
ing whether an EIS should have been prepared in the first
place. 135  On the other hand, the circuits adopting the
stricter reasonableness standard when reviewing an
agency's decision not to prepare an EIS may well shift to
the arbitrary and capricious standard outlined in the
APA I3 6 when deciding whether an EIS that has already
been prepared is sufficient. 13 7  The Eleventh Circuit in
C.A.R.E. Now, Inc. seems to indicate it would make such a
shift in the standard. 138 The court followed the reasona-
bleness standard where no EIS was prepared but cited the
14 Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1072 (1st Cir. 1980);
Town of Rye, N.Y. v. Skinner, 907 F.2d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1990); Hanly v. Klein-
dienst, 471 F.2d 828, 838-29 (2d Cir. 1972); Webb v. Gorsuch, 699 F.2d 157, 159
(4th Cir. 1983); Neighbors Organized to Insure a Sound Env't, Inc. v. McArtor,
878 F.2d 174, 178 (6th Cir. 1989); Crounse Corp. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 781 F.2d 1176, 1193 (6th Cir. 1986); Nucleus of Chicago Homowners
Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir. 1975); .
1-5 See Valley Citizens for a Safe Env't v. Aldridge, 886 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1989)
(concerning adequacy of an EIS allowing the transfer of Air Force aircraft from
one base to another). The First Circuit seemed to confuse the two standards and
treat them as the same. The court stated that review of an EIS is measured under
"a reasonableness standard . . . aimed at insuring a good faith effort by the
Agency." Id. at 459 (quoting Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v.
Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 719 (1st Cir. 1979)). Yet the court immediately cited to
another First Circuit case referring to the arbitrary and capricious standard of the
Administrative Procedure Act as the correct one to apply. Id. (citing Silva v. Lynn,
482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973)).
136 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1988).
17 See, e.g., Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 469 (9th Cir. 1973)
(applying arbitrary and capricious standard when reviewing EIS discussing envi-
ronmental effects of proposed runway at Honolulu airport); cf. Westside Property
Owners v. Schlesinger, 597 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 1979) (in case involving
transfer of F-15 aircraft to a different base, court held that it is governed by the
"rule of reason" when determining sufficiency of EIS) (citing County of Suffolk v.
Secretary, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375 (2d Cir. 1977)).
13 CA.R.E. Now, Inc., 844 F.2d at 1572.
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general rule of judicial review of agency action as being
the arbitrary and capricious standard. 39
The D.C. Circuit follows the reasonableness standard in
deciding the sufficiency of an EIS, 140 but it is not certain
which standard its courts would follow if reviewing a deci-
sion not to prepare an EIS. There is no indication that its
courts would shift to the broader arbitrary and capricious
standard in such an instance despite the APA.
A third standard has now been adopted by the Seventh
Circuit for review of FAA decisions. In Suburban O'Hare
Comm'n v. Dole,' 4' the court held that the APA, and hence
the arbitrary and capricious standard, was "clearly not ap-
plicable" to FAA decisions made under the Federal Avia-
tion Act.' 4 2 The court held, instead, that a substantial
evidence test applied. 43 Under this test, found in the
Federal Aviation Act, fact findings by the FAA are conclu-
sive if supported by substantial evidence. 44 The court
specifically rejected a prior Seventh Circuit case, which
applied the abuse of discretion standard. 45
The Seventh Circuit cited Eighth Circuit and District of
Columbia Circuit opinions in support of its reliance on
the substantial evidence test. 46 The court indicated that
in this case, like the Eighth Circuit and D.C. Circuit cases,
"no formal hearings were conducted by the agency.
Instead, the FAA received written submissions and con-
139 Id. at 1572 n.3.
140 See, e.g., Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 195-96
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
14, 787 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1986).
142 Id. at 194.
145 Id.
144 49 U.S.C.A. § 1486(e) (West Supp. 1991). The Federal Aviation Act pro-
vides that "[t]he findings of facts by the Board or Secretary of Transportation, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." Id.
14 Dole, 787 F.2d at 194 (rejecting Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307, 310 (7th Cir.
1978)).
146 Id. (citing South Dakota v. CAB, 740 F.2d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 1984) (Civil
Aeronautics Board decision derived from informal record to be reviewed under a
substantial evidence standard); Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. FAA, 600 F.2d
965, 969-72 and n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1979)(informal FAA decision should not be re-
jected if supported by substantial evidence)).
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ducted numerous non-adversary, informal proceed-
ings." 47  The court then stated that "Congress has
indicated that the substantial evidence test is the proper
standard for all FAA decisions under Section 1486 [of the
Federal Aviation Act].' 1 48  However, the court cited no
authority for that statement. The court noted that the
standard under the APA varies depending upon whether
the agency has conducted a formal hearing. 49 If a formal
hearing has been conducted, the substantial evidence test
is appropriate. 51 If there is no record of an agency hear-
ing, however, the appropriate question is whether the ac-
tion was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law.' 5' The court
then held that the APA does not apply to FAA decisions at
all.' 52 "Congress has created a special review provision
specifically designed to address precisely the type of case
before the court. The specific review provisions of Sec-
tion 1486 take precedence over the general provisions of
the APA.' ' l5 3 The case that the court relied on for this
statement, however, applied the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review. 154
It appears that the Seventh Circuit was confused when
deciding Suburban O'Hare Commission. In its earlier opin-




1- 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988).
151 Id. § 706(2)(A).
152 Dole, 787 F.2d at 194.
153 Id. (citing Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d 893, 895-96 (2d Cir. 1979)). The
court continued, stating:
The arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA is designed to pro-
tect agency decisions made without the benefit of a complete record
compiled in an adversarial or quasi-adversarial proceeding. The
lengthy and elaborate decisionmaking procedures preceding the
FAA's ... decision in this case are not the sort of informal processes
the drafters of the APA had in mind when they adopted the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review.
Id. at 195.
1.4 See Rombough, 594 F.2d at 896.
15' 589 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1978).
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findings of fact are reviewed under the substantial evi-
dence test, nonfactual analyses and agency conclusions
drawn from facts are generally reviewed under the abuse
of discretion standard of the APA. 156 Though the Starr
opinion preceded Suburban O'Hare Commission, its state-
ment of which standard applies appears more logical: the
substantial evidence test applies to facts, and the other
standards apply to conclusions regarding those facts. 57
Setting the substantial evidence test aside and merely
comparing the language of the arbitrary and capricious
standard with the reasonableness standard, the former
would seem to allow greater deference to agency deci-
sions than the latter. Yet the results in most cases appear
to be the same.
VI. RUBBERSTAMPING BY THE COURTS
Whichever standard of review is used by the courts, the
arbitrary and capricious standard or the stricter reasona-
bleness standard, the government agency almost always
wins. 58 Whether an EIS or a FONSI is prepared, it will
be found sufficient and satisfactory. 59 The NEPA is
merely a procedural requirement, 160 lacking the substance
to make any real difference. All that is accomplished is a
greater awareness because the agency must reveal its
plans before it completes them.' 6' Yet, this awareness
does not allow the public to change the inevitable
progress.
156 Id. at 310.
57 Id. See also, Albert v. Chafee, 571 F.2d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 1978) (agency's
factual determinations to remove employee reviewed under substantial evidence
test; overall action reviewed under arbitrary and capricious test); Munoz-Men-
doza v. Pierce, 520 F. Supp. 180, 186 (D. Mass. 1981) (review of HUD funding was
not done on a substantial evidence basis but rather under the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard).
158 See infra note 162 for a list of opinions resulting in favorable outcomes for
the government agencies.
159 Id.
-6 See Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 193 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
I6r 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 (1991).
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The case law track record provides an interesting statis-
tic. From a sample consisting of most of the cases con-
cerning airport and airspace expansion, the opinions
resulting in favorable outcomes for the agencies outnum-
ber those opposed by more than four to one. 162 Granted,
not all of the cases agreeing that the NEPA has been com-
plied with are incorrectly decided. However, some of the
cases tend to evidence the courts' reluctance to overturn
an agency decision even if it seems unfair not to do so.' 63
In 1973, the Ninth Circuit decided Life of the Land v.
Brinegar. 64 In the early 1960s, the public became con-
cerned with noise and safety problems which would result
from the introduction of jet aircraft at the Honolulu, Ha-
waii Airport. In 1967, a Task Force committee, consisting
of federal, state, and local officials, and members of the
public, began meeting to discuss runway construction
proposals, alternatives, and the probable environmental
effects. In June 1968, the Task Force recommended that
a new runway to be constructed on filled reefland. The
committee hoped the runway would increase safety and
reduce noise since it would be located farther from heav-
ily populated areas. In September 1968, airline repre-
sentatives to the Task Force performed their own study
and concluded that the noise problem could be solved by
-2 Those decisions which ratify the decision to expand are the following: Citi-
zens Against Burlington, 938 F.2d at 190; Allison v. Department of Transp., 908 F.2d
1024 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Town of Rye, N.Y. v. Skinner, 907 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1990);
Valley Citizens for a Safe Env't v. Aldridge, 886 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1989); Neigh-
bors Organized To Insure a Sound Env't, Inc. v. McArtor, 878 F.2d 174 (6th Cir.
1989); C.A.R.E. Now, Inc. v. FAA, 844 F.2d 1569 (11th Cir. 1988); Suburban
O'Hare Comm'n v. Dole, 787 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1986); City of Romulus v. County
of Wayne, 634 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1980); Westside Property Owners v. Schles-
inger, 597 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1979); Matsumoto v. Brinegar, 568 F.2d 1289 (9th
Cir. 1978); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973); Township
of Delhi v. McArtor, 696 F. Supp. 1157 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Steele Creek Commu-
nity Ass'n v. Department of Transp., 435 F. Supp. 196 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
The cases requiring greater compliance with the NEPA are the following: Run-
way 27 Coalition, Inc. v. Engen, 679 F. Supp. 95 (D. Mass. 1987); Davison v. Dep't
of Defense, 560 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D. Ohio 1982); and Environmental Defense
Fund v. Adams, 434 F. Supp. 403 (D.D.C. 1977).
See infra notes 164-258 and accompanying text.
"" 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973).
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simply extending the current runway. InJanuary of 1970,
the Task Force found that this extension would not pro-
vide the same benefits as the reef runway.
On January 1, 1970, the NEPA came into effect.' 65
Compliance began in December 1970, and a draft EIS was
complete in September 1971. Those drafting the EIS
were not only federal and state officials, but also the
Ralph M. Parsons Company (Parsons), a private consult-
ing firm. Previously, in June 1968, the state had hired
Parsons to perform "management consultant services for
the engineering, design and construction of the Reef Run-
way project."' 16 6 Though Parsons had a financial interest
in the outcome of the EIS, the court found that nothing in
the NEPA prevented "a firm with a financial interest in the
project [from] assist[ing] with the draft of the EIS."' 167
How could the decision process not be tainted if the
EIS was prepared by parties who desire the project's com-
pletion and have a pecuniary interest in its approval? The
court noted that compliance with the NEPA is contingent
upon "good faith objectivity rather than subjective impar-
tiality.' ' 168 It seems that Parsons would be subjectively
partial and that its interest in the outcome could color its
good faith objectivity. For that matter, the state of Hawaii
is partial as well since it desires the new runway and has
an interest in greater future tourism profits.
The court upheld the EIS as sufficient after discussing
all the alternatives, even the alternative of taking no ac-
tion. ' 69 The court concluded that the alternatives did not
alleviate the noise and safety problems as well as the reef
runway project would.'70 The EIS did discuss the pro-
ject's only adverse effect on the environment; up to 100
endangered birds would be affected on account of the dis-
165 Id. at 465.
16 Id. at 467.
167 Id.
1 Id. (citing Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289,
296 (8th Cir. 1972)).
169 Brinegar, 485 F.2d at 471 n.ll, 472.
170 Id. at 472.
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placement of 186 acres of silted coral mudflats. The court
found that the EIS's discussion of this effect was adequate
and therefore satisfied the NEPA.' 7'
On November 7, 1973, Justice Douglas of the United
States Supreme Court entered a stay of the Ninth Circuit
court ruling and an injunction to prevent the project from
continuing until the Supreme Court could hear the
case.' 72 Upon review by the Supreme Court, the stay and
the injunction were vacated. 73 Justice Douglas issued a
vehement dissent. 74 Douglas could not see how the
NEPA could be complied with when one of the authors of
the EIS had a stake in its outcome. 75 He stated:
It seems to me a total frustration of the entire purpose of
NEPA to entrust evaluation of the environmental factors
to a firm with a multimillion dollar stake in the approval of
the project. NEPA embodies the belated national recogni-
tion that we have been 'brought to the brink' by myopic
pursuit of the technological progress and by a decision-
making mechanism resting largely on the advice of the
vested interest groups. A long standing policy of listening
only to those with enough money to be heard has left our
country scarred with a continuum of environmental
abcesses. The oil-auto-concrete interests have long urged
the necessity of paving over the countryside with high-
ways .... NEPA was designed to correct in part the infor-
mation void underlying our national decision-making
mechanism. 176
Douglas pointed out that Congress intended the process
to be untainted: "An independent review of the interre-
lated problems of environmental quality is of critical im-
portance if we are toreverse what seems to be a clear and
intensifying trend toward environmental degradation."'' 77
171 Id. at 473.
712 Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 414 U.S. 1052 (1973).
173 Id. at 1053.
'74 Id. at 1053-57 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
175 Id. at 1053.
176 Id. at 1053-56.
177 Id. at 1056 n.7 (citing H.R. REP. No. 91-378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969),
reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2751, 2753).
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In the several instances in which the military has been
the agency preparing the paperwork in satisfaction of the
NEPA, the court's blind approval is even more absurd. 78
In each case, the ruling court held satisfactory the envi-
ronmental studies made by the military. Westside Property
Owners v. Schlesinger ' 79 involved the Air Force as the re-
viewing agency. Property owners near Luke Air Force
Base in Arizona challenged the sufficiency of an EIS pre-
pared by the Air Force concerning the proposed location
of F- 15 aircraft at the base. The plaintiffs claimed that the
EIS should take into account the pollution effects of the
base prior to the addition of the F-15s in order to deter-
mine the cumulative effect after the addition. In deter-
mining whether the EIS was sufficient, the court held that
it
is governed by the "rule of reason," under which an EIS
need not be exhaustive to the point of discussing all possi-
ble details bearing on the proposed action but will be up-
held as adequate if it has been compiled in good faith and
sets forth sufficient information to enable the decision-
maker to consider fully the environmental factors involved
and to make a reasoned decision after balancing the risks
of harm to the environment against the benefits to be de-
rived from the proposed action, as well as to make a rea-
soned choice between alternatives. 80
The plaintiffs argued that the decision to place the F-
15s at the base had already been made before the EIS was
prepared. The Government countered that "as long as
the EIS satisfies the technical requirements of the NEPA,
the attention paid to it by the decision-maker is irrele-
vant."'' The court merely assumed arguendo that the
178 See, e.g., Valley Citizens for a Safe Env't, 886 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1989); Sierra
Club v. Lehman, 825 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1987); Westside Property Owners v.
Schlesinger, 597 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1979); Davison v. Department of Defense,
560 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
179 597 F.2d at 1214.
1o Id. at 1217 (quoting County of Suffolk v. Secretary, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375 (2d
Cir. 1977)).
- Id. at 1218 n.4.
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NEPA required the decision-maker to carefully consider
the EIS. 8 2 If the government approaches its duties under
the NEPA as it did in this case, satisfying the statute pro-
cedurally rather than using the opportunity to explore its
effects, how much bite can the NEPA have? The agency
studying the environmental impact on the proposed site
and the alternative sites will naturally favor the original
site chosen if that is where the agency desires the planes
to be. Allowing interested agencies to conduct their own
studies and then to allow only a minimal review of its sub-
stantiality by the courts does not accomplish the goals
outlined in the NEPA and does not serve to better the en-
vironment. The Air Force, though an agency, has an in-
terest in an affirmative decision allowing the beddown of
the F-15s. This interest is parallel to Parsons monetary
interest in a positive decision in Life of the Land. Yet, de-
spite these clear interests, both studies were held
sufficient.
In Valley Citizens for a Safe Environment v. Aldridge,'8 3 the
First Circuit ruled just as the Ninth Circuit in Westside Prop-
erty Owners regarding an Air Force decision to transfer
noisier planes to Westover Air Force Base.' s4 The Air
Force prepared the draft EIS, released it for public com-
ments, altered it in response to the comments, and then
published a final EIS, approving the transfer. The Air
Force knew it wanted the planes at Westover so it drafted
the EIS in a manner that would make Westover the only
logical and plausible location. The Air Force discussed
several non-environmental factors in the EIS, and it is be-
cause of these that the alternative sites were unsuitable. 8 5
In reality, the Air Force had no restrictions on what it de-
sired to do if it narrowly tailored its objectives and utilized
182 Id.
18s 886 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1989).
'14 Id. at 459.
185 Id. at 461. The non-environmental criteria included "(1) the adequacy of
physical facilities, such as runways, ramps, etc.; (2) the recruiting potential for
reservists in the base area; (3) the costs of additional needed construction; (4) the
relationship to existing base uses; and (5) the adequacy of fuel systems." Id.
AIRSPACE EXPANSION
costs and other non-environmental factors to rebut and
counter the environmental consequences. l8 6
The court noted that the EIS discussed the definite fu-
ture noise pollution increase in detail. 8 7 "It draws map
contours showing the places and the number of people
that the sorties will expose to noise levels above 65 deci-
bels . . . and above 75 decibels .. ."18 The EIS stated
that in one five-hour operation, more than 25,500 people
will be exposed to noise pollution in the range of 65 to 70
decibels, almost 15,000 in the range of 70-75 decibels, al-
most 6000 in the range of 75-80 decibels, and nearly 1000
people to levels above 80 decibels.' 8 9 The EIS stated that
over 3500 citizens would be exposed to an average noise
level of 65 decibels and that 22 percent of them will be
"highly annoyed." 90
Simply because the EIS points out the extent of the
noise pollution, it was sufficient under the NEPA. 19' The
court held that "the EIS ... shows a clear awareness that
the individual sorties, in and of themselves, create a noise
problem .... The EIS describes the number of sorties,
their frequency, and their noise levels. It thereby fully
discloses the problem."'192 Apparently, no matter how
great the disturbance, no matter how many people are af-
fected, as long as the EIS "fully discloses the problem"
the Air Force, an interested party, will be allowed to pro-
ceed as it always wanted because it is the government
agency drafting the EIS. A court challenge is available to
those who oppose the action, but such a challenge is
nearly futile.
Davison v. Department of Defense '9 3 also supports the the-
186 See id. at 462.
187 Id. at 467.
188 Id. at 467-68. The National Academy of Sciences Guidelines state that at the
65 decibel level, outdoor speech is significantly disturbed. At the 75 decibel level,
there is a very significant disturbance. Id.
189 Id. at 468.
190 Id.
9 1 Id. at 469.
192 Id.
'93 560 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
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ory that interests of the military will be accomplished if
the military conducts the studies. In Davison, Ricken-
backer Air National Guard Base in Ohio was scheduled to
be converted into a dual civilian and military facility. The
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force approved the plan to
share the base, noting
the joint use proposal was an ideal solution from the Sec-
retary's point of view, because it allowed the government
to preserve an airfield complex that quickly could be re-
converted to a military base if necessary. It also enabled
the Air Force to maintain reserve forces at the base at a
relatively low cost.19"
The Air Force commissioned a private consulting firm to
prepare the EIS. It noted several potential environmental
effects of the proposed change but concluded that an in-
crease in noise was the only effect of significance. The fi-
nal EIS stated that 800 residents in the summer and 485
in the winter would be awakened from sleep an average of
one and one-half days per week on account of increased
flight activity during the night and early morning hours.
In addition, teaching in five area schools would be dis-
turbed for an average of three hours per week. The EIS
noted that mitigation measures could be implemented to
reduce, but not to eliminate, these effects. The Air Force
noted that it would implement the plans.
Regarding the purpose of the NEPA, the court noted
that although it "establishes 'significant substantive goals
for the Nation,' ... it does not wrest from administrative
agencies their traditional decisionmaking power." '195 The
court reviewing the sufficiency of an EIS is limited to the
discussion of three issues:
(1) whether the EIS discusses all five of the factors listed in
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) and otherwise meets the proce-
dural requirements set forth therein; (2) whether the EIS
as a whole evidences a good faith effort on the part of the
,94 Id. at 1023.
15 Id. at 1024 (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435
U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).
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preparer to comply with the demands of NEPA; and (3)
whether the EIS contains sufficient information to enable
the agency to make a reasonable and independent choice
among the available alternatives. 196
Though the EIS must discuss the potential environmental
consequences of a proposal, this requirement is subject to
reasonableness, feasibility, and practicality.197 An EIS will
not be rejected unless an error contained therein "has
fundamentally impaired the decisionmaker's ability to
take a 'hard look' at the relevant environmental issues."'' 98
The district court found that the EIS did discuss all five
factors listed in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) and was evidence
of a good faith effort of the Air Force, satisfying two of the
criteria mentioned above. '99 However, after an eleven
page discussion of the sufficiency of the EIS, the court
found that the EIS did not take a hard look at the issue of
sleep disturbance and it ordered that a supplemental EIS
be prepared, discussing the probable impact on the sleep
habits of residents living near the base. 0
Indeed, this decision by the court is one of the few that
seems to tell the agency that it must do more. The gov-
ernment argued that the preparation of a supplemental
EIS would be a waste of time and money, since the out-
come most likely will be unchanged. The court, though
realizing its role was limited, quoted Judge Friendly:
To permit an agency to ignore its duties under the NEPA
with impunity because we have serious doubts that its ulti-
mate decision will be affected by compliance would sub-
vert the very purpose of the Act and encourage further
administrative laxity in this area. The systematic investiga-
tion .. .which NEPA requires may well reveal substantial
'- Id. at 1025 (citing Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541
F.2d 1292, 1299 (8th Cir. 1976); Save Our Invaluable Land, Inc. v. Needham, 542
F.2d 539, 542-43 (10th Cir. 1976); Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819-20
(5th Cir. 1975); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1001-03 (10th
Cir. 1973); Evans v. Train, 460 F. Supp. 237, 241-42 (S.D. Ohio 1978)).
197 Id.
198 Id. at 1024.
1- Id. at 1025-26.
200 Id. at 1037-38.
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environmental consequences and ... may possibly provide
an economic alternative to [the proposed project, or] com-
pel further consideration of its propriety and necessity. 20'
Though this type of statement seems to carry weight, the
agency really is just doing more busy-work. It is unlikely
the Air Force would find a suitable alternative site, since
its reasons for allowing civilian use of the base are so
base-specific.
The court concluded that the "final decision on how
best to use the facilities at Rickenbacker rests exclusively
with the Secretary of the Air Force, not this Court. '2 2
This statement still would be true if the body performing
the EIS or the EA were completely unbiased. The court
then perhaps could assure itself that all relevant factors
are weighed and not simply the factors a biased agency
would provide.
In the Fourth Circuit, North Carolina presently is claim-
ing that the FAA cannot rely on the Navy's assessment,
but rather must perform an independent environmental
review of a proposed expansion of Navy airspace over
eastern North Carolina. 0 3 The state argued that the FAA
declined to conduct its own environmental review and
that this inaction violated NEPA procedural requirements
and mandatory CEQ regulations.20 4 Based on the cases
previously discussed,20 5 however, North Carolina's argu-
ment appears weak regardless of how valid, rational, or
logical it is in reality. The FAA disputes the allegation
that it failed to conduct its own review.20 6 Relying on the
cases above, the agency likewise should claim that the
Navy's review is sufficient in its own right since the Navy is
a federal agency.
201 Id. at 1038 (quoting City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150,
160 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)).
202 Id. at 1024.
203 FAA Defends Navy Airspace Expansion Before 4th Cir., Avi. LITIG. REP., Mar. 26,
1991, at 13175.
204 Id. at 13174.
205 See supra notes 158-202 and accompanying text.
206 FAA Defends Navy Airspace Expansion, supra note 203, at 13174.
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In Steele Creek Community Ass 'n v. Department of Transporta-
tion,20 7 the court evidenced its reluctance to overturn an
FAA decision. In 1968, plans were made to improve the
Charlotte, North Carolina airport. The NEPA, though
passed in 1969, applied to the proposals. 20 s The court
commented,
The original environmental statement of 1971 was grossly
inadequate in its evaluation of noise and other necessary
elements. It dealt hardly at all with the inevitable de facto
condemnation of at least one school and possibly some
others. It did not reveal in any fashion understandable to
laymen what effect the new runway would have upon
homes and schools and churches, and it left serious doubt
whether the necessary exploration of alternatives had
been made. 20 9
As a result of the inadequacies of the original environ-
mental statement, the proponents of the expansion were
restricted from adding the runway until 1975, when a
proper EIS was prepared.2 10
Now concerned with the new EIS and its sufficiency, the
court weighed the positives and negatives of allowing the
expansion.21 On the negative side, the runway was not
currently necessary and would not be so for many years;
all aircraft with fewer than four engines could already use
the existing runway whose length was comparable to run-
ways at Washington National Airport; the amount of ex-
cess traffic anticipated seven years from the date of the
decision, 1977, could be accommodated in a less expen-
sive manner, which also would cause less injury to the en-
vironment; the current delays averaged less than one
minute per flight, far less than at other major airports;
some churches and communities would suffer damage
from the increased noise issuing from flights on the new
runway; the new runway would have serious adverse ef-
207 435 F. Supp. 196 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
208 Id. at 197.
209 Id. at 197-98.
210 Id. at 198.
211 Id.
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fects on nearby school grounds; and the alternatives of us-
ing other available airports were not fully discussed. 1 2
The reasons for expansion, on the other hand, were
that the new runway could accommodate all commercial
planes; the runway "probably" would be safer; the noise
could be dispersed throughout a larger area; a noise
abatement program of coordinating routes was currently
being introduced; and the runway "might" lessen air pol-
lution by preventing delays.21 3 The negatives in this case
were clearly real and substantiated, whereas the positives
were mere conjecture and hypothesis. The court main-
tained that the runway probably would be safer, but had
stated earlier in the opinion that the runway would not be
needed either for "capacity or safety" reasons.2 4 The
court said that the runway "might" reduce, rather than
increase, air pollution, because delays would be re-
duced,21 5 but found earlier that delays were currently less
than one minute per flight.21 6 Instituting a noise abate-
ment program does not mean that the negatives will be
deleted, it merely means that they might be lessened.
So how could the court resolve the conflict in favor of
expansion? "[U]nder the standard of review .. .the de-
fendants have [not] failed to give the.., situation the kind
of study and analysis required by the statute and therefore
concludes that there is no violation ... 217 The court
noted that its only function was to ensure statutory com-
pliance, and it followed the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard in fulfilling this function.21 8
The review is a limited one for the purpose of determining
whether the agency reached its decision after a full, good
faith consideration of the environmental factors made
under the standards set forth in ... [the] NEPA; and
212 Id.
213 Id. at 198-99.
214 Id. at 198.
215 Id. at 199.
216 Id. at 198.
217 Id. at 199.
2 8 Id. at 199-200.
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whether the actual balance of costs and benefits struck by
the agency . . . was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient
weight to environmental factors.21 9
Despite the plaintiffs' strong case that the runway was
unnecessary and environmentally hazardous, the court
lifted its previous injunction.2 ° In effect, the court said
that, because its role was limited, it must allow the runway
extension. 22' The court, though allowing the extension,
felt the suit was worthwhile:
It should.., be noted that the suit has fully accomplished
the purposes of the Environmental Protection Act by call-
ing attention to the shortcomings in the original study; by
identifying and presenting to the community the harm
which the project will cause and thereby showing that the
true cost must be measured in terms of destruction or al-
terations in the character of communities, over and above
the mere cost of grading, equipment, paving and naviga-
tional aids. Specifically, it appears quite unlikely that the
current noise abatement procedures would be under way
but for this suit.222
In other words, the plaintiffs made the situation better for
themselves because they raised such a fuss and spent a lot
of money, even though their ultimate goal was not
achieved.223
In City of Romulus v. County of Wayne,224 the city, the
school board, and a citizen brought an action against the
government to enjoin construction of an additional run-
way at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport. Prior to the ap-
peal, the district court, like the court in Steele Creek,
219 Id. at 199 (quoting Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346
(8th Cir. 1972)).
220 Id. at 197.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 200.
223 Shouldn't the NEPA accomplish this on its own without the aid of a lawsuit?
Recall that the goals of the NEPA are to prevent environmental damage and to
educate the nation on the importance of ecological systems and natural resources.
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988). A lawsuit should not be a prerequisite to the fulfillment
of the goals.
224 634 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1980).
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enjoined construction because the original EIS was inade-
quate based on "the lack of statistical traffic information
showing a need for another runway, the lack of adequate
information about traffic congestion and delays in land-
ing, and the lack of information about the effect of noise
on nearby homes and schools. 22 5 After the government
prepared and attached the supplemental paperwork to the
original EIS, the district court dissolved the injunction.2 26
While the appeal to the Sixth Circuit was pending, the
runway was constructed, and the court held the plaintiffs'
claims moot.22 7 The importance of City of Romulus re-
volves not around the fact that the complaint was moot
but rather that all the government had to do was prepare
an additional lengthy document. There is no indication
that the government had to study the results and reevalu-
ate its decision to add the runway. The government was
simply required to do more paperwork, but this extra
work accomplished nothing. By making the NEPA merely
procedural and by combining it with the government's at-
titude that it does not have to consider the EIS care-
fully, 228 the NEPA has not brought this country as far as it
should in protecting the environment, and it is not fulfil-
ling its goals.
In Suburban O'Hare Commission v. Dole,229 a very thorough
study of the effects, costs, needs, and environmental im-
pacts of expansion of the Chicago O'Hare Airport was
prepared. The preparer of the preliminary draft of the
EIS was, however, the city of Chicago, a proponent of the
expansion. The FAA did prepare the final EIS, but used
statistics and data compiled by the city. Regardless of
how truthful and unbiased the preliminary EIS and the
data may have been, an appearance of impropriety is cre-
225 Id. at 348 (citing City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578,
586-91 (E.D. Mich. 1975)).
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 See, e.g., Westside Property Owners v. Schlesinger, 597 F.2d 1214, 1218 n.4
(9th Cir. 1979).
229 787 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1986).
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ated when the proponent of expansion determines its en-
vironmental effects.
The clearest and most recent statement concerning the
power of the courts to review agency decisions regarding
NEPA compliance appeared in Citizens Against Burlington,
Inc. v. Busey. 230 The dispute arose when the city of To-
ledo, Ohio decided to expand one of its airports and the
FAA approved the expansion. Residents near the airport
asked the court of appeals to review the FAA's decision,
claiming that the FAA violated the NEPA and other fed-
eral environmental statutes and regulations. Judge (now
Justice) Clarence Thomas discussed the purpose of the
NEPA in depth23' and stated that the NEPA was a proce-
dural mandate and did not command particular results.232
The federal judges' task in reviewing was thereby very
limited.
Because the statute directs agencies to look hard at the
environmental effects of their decisions and not to take
one type of action or another, federal judges enforce the
statute by ensuring that agencies comply with the NEPA's
procedures, not by trying to coax agency decisionmakers
to reach certain results.233
Judge Thomas continued, stating that "the only role for a
court is to insure that the agency has considered the envi-
ronmental consequences [and satisfied the statute proce-
durally]; it cannot 'interject itself within the area of
discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to
be taken.' "234 As long as the objectives of the project
chosen by the agency are reasonable and reasonable alter-
natives are considered discussed in detail, the decision of
230 938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
231 Id. at 193-94.
232 Id. at 194.
233 Id. (citing Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1983)).
234 Id. (quoting Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S.
223, 227-228 (1980)). See also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21
(1976) ("Neither [NEPA] nor its legislative history contemplates that a court
should substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental con-
sequences of its actions.").
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the agency will be affirmed.235 Judge Thomas maintained
that this rule of reason and the broad discretion to define
the goals of the project do not provide agencies with a
"license to fulfill their own prophecies. ' 236 The objec-
tives of a proposal must not be so narrowly drawn that
only one alternative, the desired one, would achieve those
objectives.237 The court held that if this were the case, the
EIS would be a "foreordained formality. ' 238 On the other
hand, if the agency drafted its goals too broadly, too many
alternatives would arise and the project would "collapse
under the weight of the possibilities. 23 9 For this reason,
the court maintained that an agency's decision is subject
only to the restraint of reasonableness.2 4 °
Judge Thomas found that the FAA had "complied with
all of the [environmental] statutes and all but one of the
regulations."'2 4 ' The regulations command that the EIS
"be prepared directly by or by a contractor selected by the
lead agency or [possibly] a cooperating agency. '24 2 Yet,
the FAA did not choose the contractor. Instead, the To-
ledo-Lucas County Port Authority243 which wanted to
make the city of Toledo its cargo hub selected the consult-
ant, Coffman Associates.2 44 The court admitted that "[b]y
failing to select the consultant that prepared the [EIS], the
FAA violated CEQregulations. '245 Yet "[t]his particular
error did not compromise the 'objectivity and integrity of
235 Citizens Against Burlington, 938 F.2d at 196.
236 Id
2317 Id. But see Valley Citizens for a Safe Env't v. Aldridge, 886 F.2d 485 (1st Cir.
1989); Sierra Club v. Lehman, 825 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1987); Westside Property
Owners v. Schlesinger, 597 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1979); Davison v. Department of
Defense, 560 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
238 Citizens Against Burlington, 938 F.2d at 196.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 191-92.
242 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c).
243 Citizens Against Burlington, 938 F.2d at 202.
244 Id. at 192.
245 Id. at 202.
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the NEPA process.' ,,246
How can the court know if the objectivity was compro-
mised when it has declared and recognized its ignorance
by stating, "[i]n examining the impacts of noise on the
environment, the FAA relies on wisdom and experience
peculiar to the agency and alien to the judges of this
court[?]" 24 7 Also, the CEQregulations are "designed...
to minimize the conflict of interest inherent in the situa-
tion of those outside the government coming to the gov-
ernment for money, leases or permits while attempting
impartially to analyze the environmental consequences of
their getting it."' 24 8 This type of conflict is clear in Life of
the Land, all military cases, and in Citizens Against Burlington.
The court, however, relied on another regulation which
stated that "any trivial violation of these regulations
[does] not give rise to any independent cause of ac-tion. ' ' 249 The court concluded that the EIS was sufficient
in all respects except one and remanded for the FAA to
determine if, by utilizing Coffman, there was a conflict of
interest.2 50 However, though that determination still had
to be made, the court declined "to enjoin the continuing
development of Toledo Express or to grant any other of
the equitable relief that the petitioners have asked for. '" 25
The court essentially predetermined the conflict of inter-
est question by allowing the expansion to continue. The
reluctance to overturn an agency decision, or even to de-
lay it for a short time, is clearly manifest in Citizens Against
Burlington.
The fact that the NEPA is perceived as merely a proce-
dural requirement is even more apparent in the case of
246 Id. (quoting Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQs Nat'il Envtl.
Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,031 (1981)).
247 Id. at 201 (citing Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360,
377 (1989)).
248 Id. at 202 (quoting Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 963 n.3 (5th Cir.
1983)).
249 Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1991)).
2- Id. at 206.
251 Id.
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the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) ex-
pansion. On April 7, 1992, the FAA approved the air-
port's final EIS, allowing DFW to receive federal money
and begin runway expansions.252 The cities in which the
airport lies plan on challenging the EIS as others have
tried in the past, believing "the final EIS is a sham, is a
fraud. '253 FAA spokesman Roger Myers said that the ap-
proval was "a fine example of the federal process at work.
We feel like we've done it correctly. '2 54 The city ordi-
nances discussed earlier are still an issue, however. The
cities think they must be complied with as a result of the
state district judge's order.255 DFW spokesman Joe
Dealey, Jr., however, does not see the ordinances as a
problem.256 As for the challenge to the EIS, Dealey is
confident the airport will prevail. "We think that their
challenge will be no more successful than the nearly 10
challenges that have emerged in the last 10 years. '"257
Bert Williams, vice chairman of the airport board,
summed up the true reason the airport will likely win:
"You can't stop change. You can't stop progress.
There's just no way to do it."'258 The way the system cur-
rently operates, he is absolutely correct. Yet, a change in
the system would allow the courts to reach a fairer result,
one based on unbiased and independent data.
VII. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the courts are correct in deciding not to upset
an agency decision since it is reasonable, or at least not
arbitrary, and since procedurally the NEPA has been satis-
fied. After all, the courts readily admit that they are not
well-informed of noise abatement methods and environ-
2152 Stacey Freedenthal, FAA Clears D/FW for Runway in Irving, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Apr. 8, 1991, at IA, 25A.







mental studies.2 59 Though logical for a court to admit its
ignorance and defer to the judgment of those better
versed, the choice of whom the courts turn to is illogical.
The FAA, though a government agency, has somewhat of
an interest in a proposed project being affirmed. The
agency exists because there is air travel. The more air
travel, the more the FAA is needed. The more the FAA is
needed, the more the employees of the FAA are secure in
their jobs. Even if not interested in the outcome of the
studies, the FAA is more likely subject to political pres-
sure and influence from high-dollar airlines and airports
looking to expand. 6 °
A more logical choice in reviewing the environmental
effects of a proposed action is an agency that will be less
subject to influence by those in the aviation industry but
yet uniquely capable of studying the probable environ-
mental outcome. This agency is the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA). By having a neutral third party
conduct the studies, the NEPA may remain procedural,
but perhaps this mere procedure will result in a decision
not to proceed. Even if the decision is to proceed, at least
the communities and especially the courts can feel a little
more secure about the decision and know it was not influ-
enced by those desiring the expansion. Rather, the public
and the courts will know that the environmental effects
have been looked at independently of the costs. A fairer
result will emerge because the balancing process will be
blessed with all of the relevant information.
The EPA and the FAA have bumped heads before re-
259 See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)
("Because analysis of the relevant documents 'requires a high level of technical
expertise,' we must defer to 'the informed discretion of the responsible federal
agencies.' " (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976))); Citizens
Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 200-01 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (relying
on unique wisdom and experience of the FAA which was beyond the capacity of
the judges).
260 See Joseph Lesser, The Aircraft Noise Problem; The Past Decade - Still Federal
Power and, at Least for a While Longer, Local Liability, 13 URB. LAw. 285, 290-97
(198 1) (accusing the FAA of being an industry-oriented agency).
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garding suggestions and solutions to certain problems.26'
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958262 authorized the FAA
to promote air safety, establish navigation facilities, and
certify commercial aircraft. In 1968, the Noise Certifica-
tion Amendment 263 provided a commission for the regu-
lation of aircraft noise.2 4
In 1972, Congress passed the Noise Control Act.265
The Act allowed the EPA to play a part in the regulatory
process of noise abatement since the FAA had done so
unsatisfactorily. 266 "The 1972 act required the FAA to
consider noise abatement proposals formulated by the
EPA, but did not require the FAA to adopt them. Conse-
quently, almost all the EPA proposals have been rejected
by the FAA." 26 7
The conflict between the FAA and the EPA also ap-
peared in Citizens Against Burlington.2 68 The court noted
that Congress desires EPA participation when another
agency prepares an EIS.269 Yet, the court maintained that
the FAA was primarily responsible for the decision.270
Though the EPA participated here, "the FAA, not the
EPA, bore the ultimate statutory responsibility for actually
preparing the [EIS], and under the rule of reason, a lead
agency does not have to follow the EPA's comments slav-
ishly - it just has to take them seriously."12 7 ' The FAA
concluded that the consequences of the action had been
26, Leland C. Dolley & Douglas G. Carroll, Airport Noise Pollution Damages: The
Case For Local Liability, 15 URB. LAw. 621, 631-635 (1983).
262 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1557 (1988).
263 49 U.S.C. § 4906 (1988).
264 Dolley & Carroll, supra note 261, at 631.
265 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1988).
26 Dolley & Carroll, supra note 261, at 632.
267 Id. (citingJohn M. Werlich & Richard P. Krinsky, The Aviation Noise Abatement
Controversy: Magnificent Laws, Noisy Machines, and the Legal Liability Shuffle, 15 Lov.
L.A. L. REV. 69, 74 (1981)).
268 938 F.2d at 201.
269 Id. -,citing 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a)).
270 Id.
271 Id. (citing Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 474 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part as
moot sub nom., Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978)).
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analyzed enough after considering the EPA's criticisms. 72
What is the use of having an EPA if it is not allowed to
protect the environment? If agencies are allowed to util-
ize business judgment and balance it against probable en-
vironmental effects, then the environment is not being
protected. Rather, the environment is merely looked
upon as a factor to be considered, one that can be sacri-
ficed if the real costs to the pro-expansionist would be too
great otherwise.
At some point the environment should not be looked
upon as an outweighable factor. The true business pur-
pose of the proposed expansion should not loom largely
in the EIS when the purpose of the NEPA is to reveal the
probable environmental effects of an action. The in-
creased awareness of environmental effects should not be
the product of a suit to test whether the NEPA has been
complied with, as it was in Steele Creek Community Ass'n v.
Department of Transportation,73 but rather the EIS should
provide this increased awareness on its own, as in Mat-
sumoto v. Brinegar.274 In Matsumoto, farmers whose land
was being acquired to build an airport brought suit to pre-
vent the acquisition. The court held the purpose of an
EIS is to increase awareness and to educate rather than to
determine whether an action should be taken.2 75
[A]n EIS is in compliance with NEPA when its form, con-
tent, and preparation substantially (1) provide decision-
makers with an environmental disclosure sufficiently de-
tailed to aid in the substantive decision whether to pro-
ceed with the project in light of its environmental
consequences, and (2) make available to the public, infor-
mation of the proposed project's environmental impact
and encourage public participation in the development of
that information.276
272 Id.
27, 435 F. Supp. 196, 200 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
274 568 F.2d 1289, 1290 (9th Cir. 1978).
275 Id. at 1290-91.
276 Id. at 1291 (quoting Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th
Cir. 1974)).
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To insure an increased awareness of environmental ef-
fects, the preparer of the EIS should be a party that is
truly independent of the proceedings and has no stake in
the outcome. The EPA will be sure to study the problem
fully and not simply take it for granted as a foregone con-
clusion that the increase will be allowed.
As it stands now, the residents nearby all airports seem
to be powerless to stop proposed actions. At most, they
can affect the outcome only slightly by causing the agency
to do what it can to reduce the impact. Yet, the residents
can never reject the project and negate the impact alto-
gether. Shame on them for not comporting with the
traditional American ideals of "progress."
